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This paper offers a first ever theoretical study of a unique financing instrument associated 
with prominent emerging equity markets in South Asia. The instrument known as badla, in 
local parlance, has two interesting aspects, which have been ignored thus far. Firstly, it may 
serve as an information transmission mechanism and can be thought of as an institutional 
response to information gaps in the emerging markets. Secondly, it creates new types of 
rents, called “market microstructure” rents for certain market players. These rents are then 
exploited to gain control of the governing boards of equity markets. Consequently, 
institutional inertia is created which hinders the badly needed reform process. 
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Markets: The Case of a Unique Financing Instrument 
 
 
“[The  information  gaps]  might  change  some  of  the  performance  characteristics,  not  to 
mention the institutional structure, of markets in which they appear.” 




A unique financing instrument is associated with prominent emerging stock markets 
of South Asia. In his paper, we show that the instrument can be thought of as an 
institutional response to the information gaps existing in these emerging stock markets. The 
instrument serves to eliminate information gaps. In this sense, the instrument provides one 
example of how information gaps change the institutional structure of markets in which they 
appear.  Furthermore, we show that the instrument gives rise to ‘microstructure rents’
1, 
which are exploited by certain players to control the management of stock markets. One of 
the puzzling features of these markets has been the recurring episodes of, what is widely 
believed to be, market manipulation by few large brokers. It’s not just that manipulation 
anecdotes abound, but careful empirical evidence also points to the same conclusion. See 
Khwaja and Mian (2005) as one example, who document empirical evidence of market 
manipulation by two large brokers in the Karachi Stock Exchange. The entire broker 
community suffers due to the actions of few large brokers in terms of reputation; however, 
they still fail to elect directors who would check such manipulation. We argue that ‘micro-
structure rents’ created by the instrument prevent a majority of small brokers from unseating 
the directors who favor large brokers. Hence, attempted reforms that would check such 
manipulation are stalled.  
The rents arise due to informal rules surrounding the allocation of financing through 
the instrument. According to North (1990), the interaction between formal and informal 
rules is the key to understanding why institutional change is often characterized by inertia 
and path-dependence.  Here, we show that the informal rules surrounding the instrument 
interact with formal rules governing the election of directors to create institutional inertia. 
The resulting institutional inertia has effectively stalled the reform process in the stock 
                                                 
1 The origin of this term is due to Echeverri-Gent (2001)   2
markets of Pakistan. Furthermore, an alternative policy recommendation arises when the 
interactions between the formal institution of elections in the stock markets and the informal 
institution of the instrument in question are taken into account. We show that it may be less 
costly to deter manipulation by discouraging small brokers from electing directors who favor 
large brokers. This is in sharp contrast with the approach that is usually taken. Normally, 
regulators attempt to carry out an investigation after strong suspicion of manipulation 
emerges that creates sufficient public pressure. But, these investigations prove too costly due 
to various factors including the political connections of the accused, who happen to be large 
market players. Such investigations, almost always, prove inconclusive because they are too 
costly to be carried out properly. 
In this paper, we model two aspects of the instrument; the information transmission 
aspect and the ‘micro-structure rent’ aspect. To our knowledge, this is the first ever attempt 
at theoretically modeling the important roles that the instrument has historically played in 
prominent emerging markets in South Asia. 
Ever since Akerlof (1970), it has been argued that information flows are necessary 
for markets to function properly in a world of asymmetric information. If buyer and seller 
have different information regarding the value of the item to be exchanged, a “lemons 
market” may arise. Unable to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality goods, buyers 
may not be willing to pay a price that elicits the supply of anything other than the lowest-
quality items. Consequently, potential gains from trade may go unrealized. A large number of 
papers in economics and finance have identified various information transmission 
mechanisms operating in financial markets. Ross (1977) identifies the management’s choice 
of debt level as a possible indicator of true value to outsiders. Leland and Pyle (1977) point 
out that the amount of self-financing by entrepreneurs can be a credible indicator of value. 
Bhattacharya (1979), Meyers and Majluf (1984), Vermaelen (1984), John and Williams (1985), 
and Miller and Rock (1985) are other examples of models in which managers successfully 
transmit their private information to outsiders through various mechanisms. It is clear that a 
properly functioning equity market requires a complex set of interlinked institutions, both 
formal and informal to strengthen information flow.  
In emerging markets, the question of information transmission becomes even more 
important since legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flow as pointed 
out in Black (2001) typically do not exist. It is clear, even to a causal observer, that ground   3
realities in emerging markets are very different from the developed markets. How do these 
markets respond? How do they continue to function? Perhaps, emerging markets respond by 
developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. That is, mechanisms unique to 
them. 
In this paper, we identify a unique information transmission mechanism operating in 
South Asian equity markets.  This mechanism is associated with the equity markets of India 
and Pakistan and operates through a unique financing instrument. The instrument, known as 
badla in local parlance, allows carry forward of open positions from one settlement date to 
the next. The party carrying forward its position pays a charge called the badla rate. An 
example clarifies. Suppose an investor buys 100 shares of stock X on Monday at Rs 1000 per 
share. Assume the settlement system is T+2, which means that the payment and delivery 
takes place two days after the transaction. That means, in our example, the investor is 
required to pay Rs 100,000 on Wednesday to the seller in exchange for the shares. If he does 
not have enough funds on Wednesday, he could defer settlement till the next settlement date 
(Friday) by using the following process: The badla financier pays the money and takes 
delivery from the seller
2, however, at the same time, the financier sells the shares to the 
investor at a price in excess of Rs 100,000. Since the sale will be settled on the next 
settlement date, the investor benefits as his open buy position has been carried forward.  The 
financier benefits since the purchase price is set to be in excess of Rs 100,000. The 
annualized percentage excess amount is termed the badla rate. The financier holds the shares 
as collateral till settlement. The badla rate is determined through the forces of supply and 
demand, independently of the type of investor or stock. The fact that the badla rates do not 
differ significantly across various stocks can be interpreted as evidence that money is 
fungible.  
Essentially, badla is an instrument that facilities a carry over transactions (COT) 
through a repurchase agreement. An investor engaged in badla is simultaneously selling and 
buying (a repurchase agreement) without changing his net position. The financier is 
simultaneously buying and selling (a reverse repurchase agreement). However, the financier 
                                                 
2 The per-share amount paid by the financier depends on the closing price on Wednesday. In our example, 
we assume that this price is equal to the price on Monday for simplicity. However, if it is lower, the 
financier pays the lower price and the investor pays the difference. Typically, the price paid by the financier 
is further marked down by a margin (2 to 5% in case of Pakistan) with the investor coming up with the 
difference.   4
is exposed to the counterparty risk. There is no way of managing this risk between the 
transaction and settlement dates since the clearing house does not guarantee this transaction. 
The presence of counterparty or default risk is the reason why badla rates are significantly 
above the risk-free rate. Specifically, the badla financier faces the risk of not being able to 
recover all of his funds if the price falls significantly between settlement dates since in that 
case the investor may be forced into default. The value of shares the financier is holding as 
collateral may erode significantly.  It is precisely this risk that allows information 
transmission to take place. It is important to note that badla financee does not have limited 
liability. He is obligated to pay back the amount to badla financier no matter what. However, 
in a sharply falling market, the financee may be forced into default. This possibility creates 
counter-party risk for the financier. 
In this paper, we present a signaling model of badla financing. We show that if a 
broker has superior information about the value of stocks, then he can credibly transmit this 
information to investors by choosing the level of badla financing to provide in each stock. 
Hence, badla may serve as a mechanism of information transmission separate from the 
obvious function of providing liquidity. The key idea is that by providing badla, the broker-
financier incurs counterparty risk. In equilibrium, this risk is justified if there is an increase in 
the perceived value of the stock financed since this increase translates into higher 
commission income for the broker.  
Badla financiers are primarily brokers. In its original form, badla allows rollover of 
unsettled transactions from one settlement date to the next indefinitely as long as the 
investor can pay the financing costs. Badla appears strange in the context of a spot market 
since it effectively superimposes a feature of the futures market (settlement in the future) 
onto the spot market. However, the interest rate in the futures market is the risk-free rate 
whereas in badla transactions, the interest rate is significantly higher due to the counterparty 
risk. The counterparty risk is significant and has resulted in various payment crises in both 
India and Pakistan. In one instance, in May 2000, several brokers in the Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) defaulted as share prices fell and badla borrowers did not pay up.  
Badla started as an informal, though legal, credit market serving equity markets in 
South Asia. However, due to the counterparty risks involved, authorities in both countries 
tried to do away with Badla several times. In India, after each ban, badla was started again in a 
modified form with an objective of better managing the counterparty risk. Eventually badla   5
was eliminated officially from Indian markets in 2001, however, it continues informally. In 
Pakistan, badla continues under the name of Continuous Funding System (CFS). There are 
plans to eliminate CFS. However, even if CFS is eliminated, it wouldn’t mean elimination of 
badla since it would continue informally. Its elimination faces stiff resistance from key market 
players. We show, in this paper, that key market players are able to mount stiff resistance due 
to the ‘microstructure rents’ that badla creates. By exploiting these rents, these market players 
are able to gain control over the management of stock markets.  This creates institutional 
inertia. 
Despite the important role played by badla, little academic research on badla exists. 
Berkman and Eleswarapu (1998) report a negative abnormal return of 15% on badla stocks 
after this financing facility was banned in India for the first time in 1994. Husain and Rashid 
(2007) investigate the link between badla financing and the performance of KSE-100 index 
and report a two-way relationship. Uppal and Mangla (2007) undertake a comparative 
analysis of stock exchanges in Bombay and Karachi in the context of badla financing. All the 
research on badla has been empirical so far. The lack of a proper theoretical framework to 
guide empirical work may have been a reason for insufficient study of badla financing. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap and is, to our knowledge, the first ever theoretical study of this 
instrument and the various roles it plays. 
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, an overview of the prominent equity 
markets in South Asia is provided in the context of the institution of badla.  Next, under the 
assumption of asymmetric information, we develop a signaling model of badla financing that 
shows that the institution of badla may lead to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (separating 
equilibrium) in which superior information held by broker-financiers is credibly transmitted 
to investors. Conditions are identified which lead to the break-down of such an equilibrium. 
Then, we show how badla creates micro-structure rents for certain players. These rents are 
exploited to control the management of the stock markets. Hence, institutional inertia is 
created that hinders the reform process. 
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1. South Asian Equity Markets and the Institution of Badla 
 
The major stock market in Pakistan, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), was established 
soon after independence in 1947. KSE has been declared the best performing stock market 
of the world in 2002 by “Business Week”. As of December 31, 2007, 654 companies were 
listed with a market capitalization of Rs 4,204.522 billion ($68 billion) having listed capital of 
Rs 671.29 billion ($10.88 billion). Average daily trade value in KSE is around $400 million. It 
is estimated that, in a booming market, approximately two-third of daily transactions are 
rolled over through badla. The amount of funds available in the badla market is estimated to 
be in excess of $1 billion at the peak of the market in 2007. Apart from badla, market 
microstructure of KSE is the same as any developed market. Trading at KSE is fully 
automated and order-driven through limit and market orders. The counterparty risk inherent 
in badla financing has caused various payment crises in KSE. In one instance, in May 2000, 
several brokers defaulted as key investors refused to clear their payments due to the 
continuous decline in the market. Badla financing can potentially worsen a fall in the market 
since badla financiers have an incentive to withdraw financing in a falling market. This is 
reportedly what happened in March 2005 according to a report by the Task Force, which 
was set-up to investigate the unprecedented decline in KSE after the March 2005 crisis.  In 
recent history of KSE, badla related crises have occurred in May 2000, September 2001, May 
2002, March 2005, and June 2006. In view of these crises, various attempts have been made 
to eliminate badla financing; however, they were strongly resisted by the market, particularly 
by large brokers. Badla remains in KSE in the form of CFS even though there are plans to 
eliminate it. However, elimination of CFS will not end badla as it is will almost certainly 
continue informally. 
  Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) is the oldest stock exchange in India. It was 
established in 1875. As of November 30, 2007, equity market capitalization is $1619.18 
billion with 4879 listed companies. BSE has an average daily turnover of about $2 billion.
3  
BSE is an automated and order-driven market like any developed market. BSE was the 
largest badla market in South Asia for a very long time. There were many crises linked with 
badla financing. In 1993, there were defaults linked to badla financing in BSE forcing the 
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Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to ban this product. However, badla was re-
started after strong resistance to the ban was shown by the broker community. After the 
March 2001 crisis, also associated with badla, SEBI banned badla officially for good. 
However, it continues informally. For a description of tussle between SEBI and broker 
community over badla, see Echeverri-Gent (2002). 
  National Stock Exchange of India
4 (NSE) was established in 1994. Unlike BSE, NSE 
was promoted by leading financial institutions at the behest of the government. NSE was the 
first demutualized exchange in the country where the ownership and management is 
completely divorced from the right to trade on it. This precluded conflicts of interests. NSE 
initially refused to allow badla. However, in 1999, it allowed badla in a modified form called 
the Automated Borrowing and Lending Mechanism (ABLM). ABLM was banned after the 
March 2001 crisis. Hence, badla financing is now officially present only in Stock Exchanges 
of Pakistan. However, market participants argue that in India badla continues by involving 
two exchanges where the first leg of the transaction is carried out in one exchange and the 
second leg in another exchange to circumvent regulations banning badla. 
5 
  Typically, badla is thought of as an instrument that provides liquidity to the market. 
However, here we show that there is much more to the story of badla than just liquidity 
provision. Firstly, it can be thought of as a signaling mechanism and an institutional response 
to the information gaps that are particularly severe in emerging markets in the absence of 
proper regulatory and institutional framework. Secondly, it gives rise to market structure 
rents, which may be exploited to control the management of these markets. No wonder, 
reform process in the stock exchanges of Pakistan has not only stalled but back-tracked and 
regulators had to fight a long and hard battle for reforms in the stock exchanges of India 
(see Echeverri-Gent (2002)).  In the next section, we turn our attention to the signaling 
aspect of badla. 
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2. Signaling through the Institution of Badla 
 
The model relies on the idea that a broker who is also a badla-financier has superior 
information about the value of various stocks. Since badla-financing generates counterparty 
risk for the financier, the broker can credibly transmit this information to investors by 
choosing to provide different levels of financing in different stocks. The broker-financier has 
an incentive to provide this information since such transmission increases the commission 
income accruing to the broker. The model can be thought of as one of the long list of 
signaling models inspired by Akerlof’s lemons market paper (Akerlof (1970)) and Spence’s 
paper on education as a signaling mechanism (Spence (1973)).  
  Suppose different types of firms have issued shares that are traded in the market. 
The number of shares issued by each firm is N. Each firm lives for one period marked by 
two points in time; time-0 and time-1. The profit of each firm is realized at time-1. A firm’s 
profit,  i x , is drawn from a uniform distribution [0,K] at time-1. The value of K differs from 
firm to firm and is uniformly distributed over [y,z]. There is a risk-neutral representative 
broker-financer who knows the exact value of K for each firm. However, outside-investors 
do not have this information. The broker-financier is assumed to strictly act as an 
intermediary (that is, the broker-financier does not trade on his own account). At time-0, the 
total transaction value intermediated by the broker-financier in a given stock is  ) ( p V T where 
0 ) ( ' . > T and  p V is the price per share.  For simplicity and without loss of generality, we 
assume that  (.) ' T  is a constant. .The broker charges a commission as a percentage of total 
transaction value. At time-0, the commission received by the broker in a given stock is 
) ( . 0 p V T f  where  1 0 0 < < f . In addition, the broker-financier also provides badla financing 
at time-0. 
  If the value of K is known, risk averse investors value each firm’s stock as: 







 where r is the risk free rate, and λ is the risk-aversion parameter.  
Since K is unknown, investors, in the signaling equilibrium, infer the value of K for each 
firm from the amount of badla financing provided in each stock: 
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So, higher the value of B, higher is the price of the stock. Consequently, higher must 
be the realized value of  i x at time-1 that ensures no loss for the broker-financier. Specifically,  
time-1 profit of broker-financier is  ) ( 1 B X if B i Ψ ≥ × = π . There is a loss of 
) ( 1 B X if B e Ψ < × − = π , where  K B < Ψ < ) ( 0 .B is the amount of badla financing, 
iis the badla rate,  ) (B Ψ is an increasing function ofB , andeis a positive constant 
between 0 and 1. For notational simplicity (and without loss of generality), we assume 
B B = Ψ ) ( . 
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The model proceeds as follows. Firstly, the risk-neutral broker-financier receives 
information about the K-value of various firms. The broker-financier then announces the 
amount of badla financing available in each stock. The interest rate on badla financing is 
exogenously given and is the same for all stocks. All of the badla funds are utilized by 
the investors. Proposition 2.1 shows that a separating equilibrium may arise in which the 
true K-value of each firm is revealed to the investors. 
.  
Proposition 2.1 If iis sufficiently small, there exists a separating equilibrium (a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium) in which the broker-financier credibly transmits superior 
information to outside-investors. In the separating equilibrium, the true K-type of each firm 
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Replacing N T / (.) ′ with a constantw, and looking for a separating 
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Using the linear approximation,  B






B a B B a
dB B a + = ∫ . 
With the above approximation, and the value of isufficiently small to ensure 





























Here, we have imposed the boundary condition,  y a = ) 0 (  (obviously, no need to signal 
the lowest type through badla). The same boundary condition can be used to solve for the 
value of c also. It follows, 
2




















































Proving badla creates counterparty risk for the broker-financier. All things equal, the risk 
is lower for high value stock when compared with a lower value stock. In equilibrium, 
this risk is compensated by the increase in commission income. Balancing of these costs 
(counterparty risk) and benefits allows a separating equilibrium to emerge. However, the 
separating equilibrium breaks down if the badla rate crosses a certain threshold 







 for the separating equilibrium to emerge). This is in line with the   11
anecdotal evidence from market participants who typically exhibit satisfaction with badla 
financing when the interest rate charged is close to the risk-free rate.  Also, in periods 
immediately preceding various market crises (for example, the March 2005 crisis in the 
Karachi Stock Exchange), the badla rate was very high. This indicates that perhaps an 
information transmission failure is also a contributing factor to market crises in emerging 
markets. 
  The signaling equilibrium may also break-down if there is segmentation in the 
badla market. That is, if different badla rates are charged in different stocks. However, 
historically, badla rates have not been significantly different for different stocks. This 
may be taken as an evidence of the realization of the signaling function of badla. 
  It is important to note that the equilibrium described here fits well with the 
empirical description of the market. There are two features of the badla market that 
appear puzzling. Firstly, the market is dominated by brokers even when there is no bar on 
the participation of banks and other financial institutions. This is especially true for 
Pakistan where authorities tried to encourage banks to participate in this market.  
Secondly, in normal times, badla rates do not appear high enough to justify the 
significant counterparty risks that it entails. These aspects seem to indicate that there are 
some indirect benefits of badla that only accrue to broker-financiers and not to outside 
financiers. The broker specific accrual may be due to the increase in commission income 
enhanced by the signaling function as described above. Obviously, outsiders cannot claim 
commission income. These indirect benefits also keep the badla rates low effectively 
making badla an infeasible investment for outside financiers.  
Next, we turn our attention to another aspect of badla financing. We show that 
badla creates ‘micro-structure rents’ for certain players. Due to these ‘micro-structure 
rents’, essential market reforms have been stalled. 
 
3. Micro-structure Rents and the Institution of Badla  
 
Typically, economists recognize two types of rents; innovation rents and intervention rents 
(Buchanan (1980)). Innovation rents are rewards for innovation that arise in the context of 
the market and are considered welfare enhancing. However, such rents tend to dissipate   12
quickly as others imitate the innovator.  In contrast, intervention rents arise due to state 
intervention and are considered welfare reducing. Echeverri-Gent (2002) argues for a third 
type of rent called the ‘market micro-structure rent’. Such rents are said to arise when the 
trading rules and institutions that comprise a market micro-structure benefit particular 
market participants. 
  Badla providers are typically a small number of large brokers. Badla is lucrative to all 
brokers, irrespective of their size, since it magnifies their trading volumes and commission 
incomes. Financial institutions such as banks typically stay away from the badla market due to 
the substantial counterparty risks and separation of the lending function from the investment 
function. Hence, market participants are generally dependent on a small number of large 
brokers for their badla funds. Consequently, the institution of badla puts a few large broker-
financiers in a privileged position. Hence, micro-structure rents are created.  
  To understand the significance of these rents, it is essential to understand the story 
of attempted stock market reforms in South Asia. In particular, the story of attempted 
institutional reforms in the stock exchanges of Pakistan is a very interesting one. We tell the 
story here with particular reference to the Karachi Stock Exchange, however, the description 
is, more or less, applicable to the other stock markets in the region. There are two main 
institutions in the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The term institution here means “rules of 
the game”. The rules can either be formal or informal. The two primary institutions in KSE 
are: a financing institution called badla, and a governing institution that specifies how the 
directors are elected. These directors form the governing board of KSE and are responsible 
for smooth functioning of day-to-day operations. After the March 2005 crisis, policy makers 
came out with a plan of reforms which was aimed at reforming both the above mentioned 
institutions. However, both sets of reforms have been stalled due to resistance from key 
market players.  
Apart from the question of why those resisting reforms have succeeded, there are 
two related questions that must also be answered. Firstly, brokers themselves have argued 
for and successfully implemented certain reforms. Reforms such as the introduction of 
electronic trading, ‘dematerialization’ of shares through creation of CDC, switching from 
‘quote driven’ trading to ‘order driven’ trading, and replacing periodic settlements with 
rolling settlements were broker-driven.  Without any doubt, all these reforms have made 
trading more transparent and safer by reducing opportunities of manipulation by brokers   13
and by reducing systematic risk. Elimination of badla financing and demutualization (policy 
maker driven reforms which the brokers are stalling) are also aimed at reducing manipulation 
and systematic risk. If all the reforms have the same objective, how come brokers forcefully 
argue for some and stall the others?  
It is also a common perception among participants and commentators that most of 
the benefits of market manipulation go to big brokers who are not more than a dozen in 
number. However, the reputational costs are shared by the entire broker community. There 
are 200 brokers in KSE alone (about 140 are active). If most of the gains go to only a dozen 
and the costs go to all, why don’t the other brokers out-vote the manipulating bloc and elect 
directors who would check such manipulation? 
Here, we argue that all three questions raised above have a common answer. The 
answer lies in understanding the interactions between announced formal rules and 
historically developed informal rules. If we consider the process of reforms as a mere 
transplantation of formal rules from developed markets to our markets, the questions remain 
unanswered. But, if we consider the interactions of these transplanted rules with existing 
informal rules underlying our markets, then things appear to fall into place and coherent 
answers to the questions raised above are found. Along the way, we will see that the 
underlying ‘rent structure’ that shapes the informal rules is very different from what one 
typically sees in developing countries. Normally, rent-seekers aim to gain privileged positions 
through favorable government interventions. The “SRO culture” in the industrial sector of 
emerging economies is a case in point. But as far as the stock market is concerned, the 
privileged positions have arisen endogenously through market interactions. Hence, the rent-
seekers of the stock market do not want government interference in their affairs. 
Consequently, the politics of rent-seeking is very different in the stock market.  
Let’s consider the third question first. Consider two games, one with formal rules 
and another with informal rules. Initially, assume that the two games are not linked. The 
formal game has legally spelled out procedures for election of 5 member directors. There are 
about 200 brokers who can vote. The informal game is one in which few large brokers 
decide how to allocate badla funds to other brokers. Badla is lucrative to all brokers since it 
magnifies their trading volumes and consequently their incomes. Of course, large brokers 
with badla funds have complete freedom to decide who gets badla. If the two games are 
separate, it is optimal for the majority of small brokers to unseat member directors who   14
favor large brokers in the formal game. But, by strategically linking the two games, that is, by 
making badla availability in the second game conditional on cooperative voting in the first 
game, a few powerful brokers can manipulate the outcome of elections. No wonder, the 
governing board of the exchange does not act to check manipulation. 
The second question is now fairly easy to answer. Broker-driven reforms are exactly 
those that increase the component of the informal game in the pooled incentive constraint 
across the two games. “Dematerialization of shares”, “badla market operating in parallel with 
the spot market” and “rolling settlements”, all increase the efficiency with which the badla 
funds can be employed along with some mitigation of systematic risk. Both outcomes are 
favorable to badla financiers. That is, broker-driven reforms are exactly those that increase 
the de facto power of already powerful brokers. In contrast, regulator-driven reforms are 
those that, if implemented, will weaken the component of the informal game in the pooled 
incentive constraint across the two games. No wonder such reforms are stalled. Hence, the 
brokers’ response to the two sets of reforms is entirely consistent.  
The first question can now be answered. The institution of badla creates 
microstructure rents (through strategic linkage across the two games) as described above. 
Such microstructure rents are exploited to control the management of KSE. Consequently, 
regulators cannot negotiate their way to success with KSE management because powerful 
brokers who run the show will never accept elimination of their source of power through 
negotiations. In short, when the institution of badla is targeted for reforms, powerful brokers 
strengthen their hold on the governing institution and use their increased power to stall the 
attempted reforms. That is, the institutions of badla and governance are inter-dependent. 
Furthermore, the microstructure rent associated with the institution of badla has arisen 
endogenously in the market and no government action was involved.  




Suppose small brokers (S) have two voting options; they can either vote for the directors 
who are in league with large brokers who engage in market manipulation (V) or vote for the 
directors who would check manipulation (N). For simplicity and without loss of generality, 
we assume that the small brokers act as a group (they have solved their collective action   15
problem). The way S votes determines the outcome of the election of the governing board 
of the stock market. The directors (D), once elected, can either move to check manipulation 
(C) or ignore it (A). Manipulation results in rents equal to R to large brokers, however, there 
is a reputation cost of manipulation to all brokers. Denote the reputation cost to large 
brokers as  l r  and the cost to small brokers as  s r . Figure 1 shows the extensive form.  
 
Remark 1  In equilibrium, small brokers (S) vote for the directors who check manipulation. 
 
We next describe the badla financing game. In this game, the large brokers allocate badla 
funds to small brokers. There are n small brokers. Large brokers who act as a group make 
badla allocation conditional on favorable voting behavior in the election game.  The amount 
of badla funds allocated to each small broker every period in the case of favorable voting in  
the one shot election game is denoted by b. Only large brokers have badla funds. The total 
amount of badla funds available with them are B.  Badla is lucrative to all brokers because 
they earn a commission income on badla facilitated transactions. The commission income on 
badla transactions of b is cb per period. Large brokers, if they engage in manipulation, face 
an expected penalty of f in the form of fines by regulatory authorities.  
Large brokers (who act as a group) earn an interest ion the badla funds they provide for 
lending. If they lend badla funds directly to investors they also earn the additional 
commission income described above. If they lend funds indirectly, that is, they provide badla 
to small brokers and small brokers then lend to investors, large brokers forego commission 
income, since commission income accrues to small brokers in that case.  Providing badla 
involves counterparty risk, hence, large brokers’ interest income iis marked down by a term 
e due to the expected losses arising out of the counterparty risk. Hence, the total per period 
income to large brokers from badla activity of B if they lend directly to investors is: 
B e c i cB B e i ) ( ) ( − + = + −  
If part of the funds is lent through small brokers and given that there are n small brokers 
and each small broker gets funds equal to b, the total per period badla related income of large  
 




brokers is:  cnb B e c i nb e i nb B e c i − − + = − + − − + ) ( ) ( ) )( ( . The commission income 
accruing to small brokers each period is cnbif they get badla funds. 
The two games proceed simultaneously and are infinitely repeated. 
 
Proposition 3.1  An equilibrium in which small brokers (S) vote for the directors who favor 
large brokers can be sustained through strategic linkage with the badla game if and only if 
both of the following conditions hold 
0 ≥ − s r cnb                     (3.1) 
l r f cnb R + ≥ −                   (3.2) 
 
Proof. Consider a grim trigger strategy: Both players cooperate till one player defects. After 
that, cooperation breaks down forever. If small brokers vote (V) in the election game, the 





. If (3.1) does not hold, 
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does not hold, then the arrangement is too costly for large brokers. Strategic linkage is 





The punishment and reputation cost parameters  l r f , and  s r are taken as exogenous by the 
parties. However, one can think of the government as a strategic player that attempts to 
structure the game so as to reduce the level of manipulation.  
  If punishment and detection of manipulation is costless to the government, checking 
and controlling manipulation is trivial; the government only needs to set the parameter 
f high enough to ensure that l r cnb R f − − ≥ . However, in general, it is likely to be costly 
to the government to monitor and punish those who engage in manipulation. These costs 
may arise due to monitoring, exacerbated by the difficulty of collecting hard evidence and 
pursuing a trial. There may also be political constraints and so on. The government may also 
try to increase the reputation costs of manipulation to brokers;  l r and/or  s r by providing 
information through media. One way may involve government experts and regulators 
appearing in front of media and sharing evidence. Another is leaking confidential reports to 
newspapers. Obtaining such information and disseminating it may entail significant costs. 
For simplicity, we assume that the reputation costs are equal to both parties,  r r r s l = = . We 
postulate a function  ) , ( r f c that represents the cost to the government of achieving an 
expected level of punishment of  f and reputation costs to the brokers ofr . Assume that 
c(.,.) is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments. 
  There are two distinct ways of preventing manipulation according to proposition 3.1.  
The government may make manipulation infeasible for large brokers by choosing  f and 
r such that cnb R r f − > + .  Alternatively, the government may ensure that small brokers 
have no incentive to vote for the directors who favor manipulation. That is, by ensuring 
that cnb r > . The options available to the government are shown in figure 2.  






Manipulation will be deterred if the government chooses a combination that lies in the areas 
A, B, or C. The government’s optimal strategy crucially depends on the shape of the 
function  ) , ( r f c  (the shape of its iso-cost curves). As an example, figure 2 shows three iso-
cost curves.  In case (1), the least cost way for the government to deter corruption is to make 
it infeasible for large brokers, that is, by ensuring that cnb R r f − > + . In cases (2) and (3), 
the least cost way for the government to deter corruption is eliminate small brokers’ 
incentive to vote for manipulating directors by increasing the reputation costs;  cnb r > . 
 
Proposition 3.2 If 
] , 0 [ ) , ( ) , 0 ( r X X X cnb R c cnb c ∈ ∀ − − ≤  










cnb R −  




Incentive constraint   19
Proof. . If the above condition holds then it is costlier to eliminate manipulation by making 
it infeasible for large brokers ( cnb R r f − > + ) then by making it unattractive to small 
brokers ( cnb r > ). 
￿ 
 
Proposition 3.2 highlights that it may be worthwhile for the government to pursue a very 
different anti-manipulation strategy than what is commonly thought. As one example, the 
government of Pakistan, in one case, had spent million of dollars in trying to carry out 
forensic investigation of the activities of large brokers after the March 2005 market crash,  
widely believed to be the result of manipulation by large brokers. However, the difficulty of 
collecting hard evidence in the presence of confounding factors, as well as constraints arising 
from political connections of the accused, prevented them from building a case against those 
involved.  Alternatively, another approach may involve increasing the reputational costs of 
small brokers in various ways including encouraging media coverage of disgruntled small 
investors, pensioners, and senior citizens who typically are the primary victims of 
manipulation schemes. The government may encourage publication of hard-hitting articles 
that analyze how the governing board of director is ineffective in checking manipulation and 
how small brokers tend to vote for manipulating directors. Regulators may have a better 





We have taken a detailed look at a unique financing instrument associated with prominent 
equity markets in South Asia. The instrument known as badla may be an institutional 
response to the information gap existing in these markets. The information gaps in these 
emerging markets tend to be fairly serious since legal and institutional pre-conditions for 
proper information flows are not present in these markets. Badla may serve a useful purpose 
by eliminating such information gaps. The institution of badla also gives rise to ‘micro-
structure’ rents, which are exploited by large borkers/badla financiers to gain control of the 
governing board of directors.  The board turns a blind eye to manipulation schemes run by 
large brokers.  It may be worthwhile to pursue an alternative anti-manipulation strategy   20
compared to what the regulators typically pursue. The alternative strategy involves 
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